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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Holmes Development, LLC ("Holmes") appeals two orders by the trial
court that collectively dismiss Holmes' Complaint with prejudice and grant
summary judgment on behalf of defendants First American Title Insurance
Company ("First American"), Paul Cook and Cook Development, LC (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Cook"). Judge J. Dennis Frederick of the Third
Judicial District Court signed and entered a Summary Judgment order on behalf of
First American on May 18, 2000. (R. at 261-265; see also Addendum, Exhibit A.)
Thereafter, on August 2, 2000, a Summary Judgment order, signed by Judge
Frederick on July 28, 2000, was entered granting summary judgment on behalf of
Cook. (R. at 266-269; see also Addendum, Exhibit B.) The August 2, 2000 order
disposed of all remaining issues, claims and parties. Therefore, certification
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was not necessary.
Holmes timely filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court on August 24, 2000.
(R. at 270-271.) The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Holmes' appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended) by virtue of the
above referenced proceedings.

1

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to the trial court's ruling and order granting First American's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment, Holmes presents the
following three issues for review.
1.

Did First American's efforts to defend Holmes' title by preparing a

faulty Special Warranty Deed that fueled litigation adverse to Holmes' title and
that required litigation and a corrective affidavit to validate constitute "appropriate
action" under the terms of the Policy of Title Insurance and did the trial court err
when it resolved this question of fact in First American's favor through summary
judgment? (R. at 85-92; T. at 27-28.)
2.

Did the trial court err in rejecting Holmes' arguments that First

American assumed additional contractual duties beyond those associated with the
issuance of a title insurance policy and that First American's subsequent
successful defense of Holmes' title pursuant to First American's title insurance
obligations does not immunize First American's breach of those additional
contractual duties? (R. at 85-92; T. at 28-29.)
3.

Did the trial court err in denying Holmes' Motion to amend its

complaint in response to First American's Motion to Dismiss given the fact that

2

leave should be freely granted pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R. at 92; T. at 27.)
As to the trial court's ruling and order granting Cook's Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Holmes presents the following three
issues for review.
1.

Did the trial court err in ruling that First American's successful

defense of Holmes' title rendered the provisions of the Indemnity Agreement
signed by Cook moot and inapplicable and that the defense of Holmes' title also
retroactively cured Cook's breach of the warranties made in the deeds they signed
and released them from their contractual obligations outlined in the Indemnity
Agreement? (R. at 235-240; T. at 31.)
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the economic loss rule bars

Holmes' recovery even though the Indemnity Agreement signed by Cook entitles
Holmes to recover the damages it sustained as a result of Cook's breach of the
warranties and contractual obligations established by the deeds and the Indemnity
Agreement signed by Cook? (R. at 240-244; T. at 31-32.)
3.

Did the trial court err in denying Holmes' Motion to amend its

Complaint in response to Cook's Motion to Dismiss (R. at 245; T. at 27) given the

3

fact that leave should be freely granted pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure? (R. at 245; T. at 27.)
On appeal, the question of whether or not summary judgment is appropriate
is a question of law. Consequently no deference is given to the trial court's
decision and legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Wilson v. Valley
Mental Health. 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998); Klinger v. Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868
(Utah 1990). The trial court's findings of fact are given deference and reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard keeping in mind that the facts and all
inferences reasonably drawn from those facts must be viewed in a light most
favorable to Holmes as the non-moving party. Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1989); see also Owns v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989). The
question of whether or not the trial court erred in denying Holmes' motion to
amend its Complaint is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. Westley v.
Farmer's Insurance Exch.. 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983).
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no statutes, rules, constitutional provisions, regulations or
ordinances that are determinative of the issues presented for review. The trial
court relied, in part, on the economic loss rule, in dismissing Holmes' claims to
the extent Holmes relies on negligence or tort-based causes of action. Also, the
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case of Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall. 795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990)
was cited by First American in support of its claims that its successful defense of
Holmes' title immunized First American from its own mistakes in failing to
discover the defect in Cook Development's title.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and its
Disposition in the Trial Court
On October 20, 1999 Holmes filed a Complaint against defendants Paul
Cook, Cook Development and First American. (R. at 1-20.) Holmes sued these
defendants for negligence, breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligent
misrepresentation and indemnification.1 (R. at 1-20.) Holmes' claims against
First American arise out of First American's unquestionable malpractice and
errors in first creating and then failing to properly discover, disclose and remedy a
serious defect in title to land Holmes purchased from Cook Development. Holmes
sued Cook for breach of warranty and for indemnification pursuant to an
Indemnity Agreement signed by Cook at the time the transaction was
consummated. (R. at 1-20.)

'The indemnification claim applies only to Cook. (R. at 17.)
5

Defendants each responded to Holmes' Complaint by filing motions to
dismiss. (R. at 23-77; 159-213.) Defendants'arguments focused primarily on
First American's successful defense of Holmes' title in litigation hostile to
Holmes and the economic loss rule. Judge J. Dennis Frederick of the Third
Judicial District Court treated each motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment because matters outside the pleadings were considered. By a Minute
Entry Ruling dated April 11, 2000, Judge Frederick granted summary judgment on
all claims against all defendants. (R. at 255-256.) A Summary Judgment order on
behalf of First American was entered by the trial court on May 18, 2000. (R. at
261-265; see also Addendum, Exhibit A.) A second Summary Judgment order
granting summary judgment on behalf of Cook was entered by the trial court on
August 2, 2000. (R. at 266-269; see also Addendum, Exhibit B.) Holmes timely
filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court on August 24, 2000. (R. at 270-271.)
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In 1993, Cook purchased two tracts of land east of Heber City, Utah

with the intention of developing and selling residential building lots. Cook
developed a portion of the property focusing his efforts primarily on the largest
tract of land consisting of approximately 323 contiguous acres. By 1997, the first

6

phase of the development, known as Lake Creek Farms, was nearly sold out. (R.
at 3,1ffl8-l2.)
2.

Due to financial difficulties, Cook eventually associated with a

partner by the name of Premier Homes ("Premier"). Premier promised to infuse
the project with new cash flow. (R. at 3, ff 9-16.)
3.

Cook and Premier jointly formed two limited liability companies,

Lake Creek Farms, LLC and Lake Creek Associates, LLC. Cook Development
and Premier were the only members of these two new entities and the property
consisting of the unsold lots and undeveloped property remaining in Lake Creek
Farms was deeded to the new LLCs. Thereafter, Lake Creek Farms, LLC owned
the 323 acre parcel and Lake Creek Associates, LLC owned a smaller 73 acre
parcel that was not part of the pending development plans. (R. at 4, Iff 17-22.)
4.

Eventually, Cook and Premier parted ways. According to Cook,

Premier and Cook Development agreed that Lake Creek Farms, LLC and Lake
Creek Associates, LLC would each transfer their respective ownership interests in
the Lake Creek Farms' property to Cook Development.2 (R. at 5,ffif23-25.)

2

In order to accomplish this transfer, it would be necessary for Lake Creek Farms,
LLC to convey the 323 acre parcel to Cook Development and Lake Creek Associates
would likewise need to convey the 73 acre parcel to Cook Development as well.
7

5.

In furtherance of that agreement, Cook hired First American to

prepare two deeds wherein Lake Creek Farms, LLC and Lake Creek Associates,
LLC would convey title in the 323 and 73 acre parcels back to Cook
Development. (R. at 5, If 26; 80,1f 1.)
6.

First American prepared two quit claim deeds. Unfortunately, both

deeds identified Lake Creek Associates, LLC as the grantor, including the deed for
323 acre parcel that was actually owned by Lake Creek Farms, LLC. Cook and
First American failed to discover this error and Cook immediately sought and
obtained new interim financing through Clark Real Estate. First American again
handled the closing of the Clark Real Estate loan, prepared and recorded a trust
deed and issued title insurance in that context. First American did not discover its
own error at that time. (R. at 6,130-38; 80, ^ 2-3; 116-117.)
7.

In April of 1998, Holmes agreed to purchase the unsold lots and

property remaining in Lake Creek Farms.3 (R. at 183-188.) Part of Holmes'
obligations included paying off the Clark Real Estate loan. Thereafter, Holmes
closed the sale and Cook Development conveyed the 323 and 73 acre parcels to
Holmes by way of a Warranty Deed. First American prepared all closing

3

Holmes agreed to purchase both the 323 acre parcel as well as the smaller and
undeveloped 73 acre parcel.
8

documents, deeds, settlement statements and otherwise acted as the escrow agent
for the transaction. (R. at 8, f 44; 82, ^ 7-10.)
8.

In connection with Holmes' purchase, Cook signed an Indemnity

Agreement. Cook executed the Indemnity Agreement on May 19, 1998 at the
closing. (R. at 180-181; see also Addendum Exhibit C.) The Indemnity
Agreement states in relevant part:
(a) Any and all claims that arise from, or are in any way
related to, Seller's acquisition, ownership or development of the
Covered Property prior to the date of this Agreement, except for those
claims covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant
to the Purchase Agreement;
(b) Any damage, loss or deficiency resulting from any
misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any
covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any
agreement or any other document executed in connection with
Holmes purchase of the Covered Property; and
(c) All actions, suits, proceedings, demands, settlements,
assessments, judgments, costs, investigation expenses, interest,
penalties, legal fees and expenses incident to the transactions between
Cook Development and Holmes or involving or in connection with
the Covered Property.
(R. at 180; see also R. at 8, % 46, 180, 233-244; T. at 31; Addendum, Exhibit C.)
9.

On May 19, 1998, Holmes and Cook also executed a "Modification

and Extension Agreement" (the "Extension Agreement"). Cook makes
representations and warranties in the Extension Agreement similar to those made

9

in the Warranty Deed. The Extension Agreement states in relevant part as
follows:
Seller hereby represents and warrants that it has full legal and
equitable title to the Property, subject only to the liens, charges,
restrictions or encumbrances either of record or disclosed in the
Original Agreement.
(R. at 194, f 3; 233,ffif3-4; T. at 31.)
10.

First American prepared the Warranty Deed whereby Cook attempted

to convey its purported ownership interest in the 323 and 73 acre parcels to
Holmes. (R. at 8, f 46.) First American also prepared the closing documents,
recorded the Warranty Deed and handled all aspects of the closing. First
American charged fees for each of these services. (R. at 119-121; T. at 28-29)
Additionally, First American issued a title insurance commitment report and a
Policy of Title Insurance (the "Policy") on behalf of Holmes and charged a
separate fee to issue that Policy. (R. at 81, If 4; 140-46; 196; 233, % 5.)
11.

Unfortunately, Cook Development did not possess title to the 323

acre parcel it tried to convey to Holmes even though Cook made numerous
statements through written warranties expressed in the Warranty Deed, the
Indemnity Agreement and the Extension Agreement that it was the owner of the
323 acre parcel. (R. at 194, 233, f 1; 234, If 6.)

10

12.

Holmes immediately began developing Phase VIIA of the project in

anticipation of selling lots in the coming spring of 1999.4 In furtherance of that
goal, Holmes obtained financing from Bank One of Utah ("Bank One"). Bank
One approved Holmes for a substantial seven figure loan and submitted the
closing of that loan and the preparation of a trust deed to First American's Salt
Lake City office.5 (R. at 9, % 47-49; 82, % 8; 234, % 7.)
13.

In examining title for the Bank One loan, First American discovered

the error in the deed from Lake Creek Associates, LC to Cook Development
purporting to convey the 323 acre parcel to Cook Development and upon which
Cook Development and Holmes relied when Cook attempted to convey title to
Holmes. (R. at 9 4 50.)
14.

Recognizing its mistakes, First American first attempted to cure the

fatal defect in Holmes' title by asking Premier to sign a new deed. Premier
4

Due to the short building season in Wasatch County, the prime selling season for
residential building lots is in the spring. Purchasing a lot in the spring leaves enough time
for the owner and builder to build a home, or at least frame and roof the home, before the
weather worsens in the fall. For reasons that will become apparent below, the inability of
Holmes to sell or even market lots during the spring of 1999 was a devastating blow to
the momentum of the project and resulted in lost sales, lost profits and significant cash
flow problems for Holmes.
5

First American's Heber City office handled all prior transactions including most
of the closings of individual lot sales, the preparation of trust deeds and documents
associated with interim financing obtained by Cook after it purportedly received title back
from the two LLCs and the preparation of deeds and documents associated with Holmes'
purchase. (R. at 6,ffif27-29.)
11

refused. Thereafter, and at First American's request, Paul Cook signed a Special
Warranty Deed in an effort to effectuate the transfer of the 323 acre parcel from
Lake Creek Farms, LC to Holmes.6 (R. at 9,fflf51-54; 82, ^ 9; 123.)
15.

Unfortunately, First American erred again in preparing the Special

Warranty deed from Lake Creek Farms, LC to Holmes.7 Instead of having Paul
Cook sign the deed on behalf of Cook Development in its capacity as a member of
Lake Creek Farms, LC, First American prepared the Deed showing Paul Cook
signing the Special Warranty Deed in his individual capacity. However, Paul
Cook was not a member of Lake Creek Farms, LC and had no authority as an
individual to convey any real property owned by Lake Creek Farms, LC. (R. at
10,1fl[ 55-58; 82, f 10.)
16.

Holmes thereafter closed the loan with Bank One and invested the

loan proceeds in the development of Phase VIIA. In November, 1998, Premier, as

6

The preparation of the Special Warranty Deed is an implicit admission by First
American that the Warranty Deed it prepared that was designed to convey title from Cook
Development to Holmes was worthless and ineffective. To this day, title vests in Holmes
through the Special Warranty Deed, not the Warranty Deed. (R. at 199-213.) However,
even the Special Warranty Deed was negligently prepared and required litigation and a
corrective affidavit before it was validated by the trial court in litigation adverse to
Holmes' title.
7

It is interesting to note that First American's efforts with the Special Warranty
Deed represented a conveyance from an entity (Lake Creek Farms, LC) that was not a
party to Holmes purchase from Cook and that had no relationship with Holmes,
contractual or otherwise.
12

a member of and on behalf of Lake Creek Farms, LC, conveyed the 323 acre
parcel to Keystone Development ("Keystone"). Keystone promptly recorded a lis
pendens against the 323 acre parcel and initiated a quiet title action (the "Keystone
litigation") in the Fourth Judicial District Court. (R. at 11,ffi[61-62, 64.)
17.

Keystone named as defendants Holmes, Paul Cook, Cook

Development, First American and Bank One. Pursuant to the obligations imposed
on it by virtue of the Policy issued to Holmes and a similar policy issued to Bank
One, First American hired local counsel to defend all of the named defendants in
the Keystone lawsuit. (R. at 11,ffif63, 65; 83, % 14.)
18.

In an effort to defend Holmes' title and correct First American's

mistake in the Special Warranty Deed, defense counsel prepared a corrective
affidavit wherein Paul Cook states that he intended to sign the Special Warranty
Deed in his capacity as the managing member of Cook Development and that
Cook Development intended to convey the 323 acre parcel to Holmes on behalf of
Lake Creek Farms, LC of which Cook Development was a member along with
Premier. (R. at 130-137; 84, f 19.)
19.

Defense counsel recorded Paul Cook's affidavit with the Utah County

Recorders Office and filed the same in the Keystone litigation. (R. at 130-137.)
Paul Cook's affidavit was later referred to and relied on by defense counsel and
13

the Fourth District Court to determine Paul Cook's intent in signing the Special
Warranty Deed in spite of First American's error in identifying Paul Cook as
signing in his individual capacity.8 (R. at 84, f 19; 130.)
20.

The Fourth Judicial District Court entertained oral argument on

motions for summary judgment filed by the respective parties in the Keystone
litigation. The Honorable Judge Fred Howard eventually granted summary
judgment on behalf of Holmes and the other defendants and entered an order
quieting title in Holmes and releasing the lis pendens recorded by Keystone. (R.
at 63-77.) The summary judgment order was signed by Judge Howard on June 29,
1999. (R.at68.)
21.

During the pendency of the Keystone litigation Holmes could not

market the Lake Creek Farms development and could not sell a single lot due to
8

The issue of Paul Cook's intent when he signed the special warranty deed and in
what capacity he signed the same was a major issue in the Keystone litigation. As can be
seen by the Summary Judgment Order signed by the Honorable Judge Fred D. Howard,
(R. at 63-77), the major focus of Judge Howard's ruling was whether or not Paul Cook
had the authority to convey the 323 acre parcel to Holmes on behalf of Lake Creek
Farms, LC. That very question turned on the Utah Limited Liability Company Act and
the issue of in what capacity Paul Cook was acting when he signed the Special Warranty
Deed. Paul Cook's affidavit established his intent to sign on behalf of Cook
Development as a member of Lake Creek Farms, LC, rather than in his individual
capacity. (R. at 63-77.) The Keystone court specifically ruled that there was no dispute
as to the fact that Paul Cook intended to convey the property to Holmes in the Special
Warranty Deed Cook signed on September 3, 1998. (R. at 64-66.) This conclusion was
possible because of Paul Cook's affidavit and that fact that Keystone failed to offer any
evidence to the contrary or create a dispute as to any material facts associated with Paul
Cook's intentions.
14

the lis pendens filed and recorded by Keystone and because of the obvious defect
in Holmes' title, a defect that Keystone exploited in its quiet title action. (R. at 12,
If 68.)
22.

Holmes continued making interest payments to Bank One in

connection with the loan Holmes procured from Bank One in September of 1998,
even though it could not generate any cash flow from lot sales so long as
Keystone's lis pendens was in effect. (R. at 12, ^f 69.)
23.

Because the selling season for Wasatch County is short, Holmes lost

the prime selling season, including the spring of 1999, and suffered damages in
the form of lost profits and lost sales, not to mention the fact that Holmes
continued to outlay funds to pay for the property and make interest payments on
its loan with Bank One. (R. at 12, f s 70-71; 235, f 9.)
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First American cannot hide behind the Policy it issued to Holmes, or its
successful defense of Holmes' title, to immunize it from its errors. The Policy
issued to Holmes requires First American to take "appropriate action" to defend
Holmes' title. However, First American did not take appropriate action and
breached its obligations to Holmes under the Policy. (R. at 85-87.)

15

Specifically, First American breached its obligation to take appropriate
action to defend Holmes' title when it prepared the faulty Special Warranty Deed
intended to have Cook Development, in its capacity as a member of Lake Creek
Farms, LC, convey the 323 acre parcel to Holmes. That effort was of questionable
efficacy to begin with and turned on whether or not Cook Development had
unilateral authority to convey real estate owned by Lake Creek Farms, LC without
Premier's permission. (R. at 85-87.)
First American also did not take appropriate action when it contacted
Premier thereby alerting Premier to the title problem. To make matters worse,
First American prepared the faulty Special Warranty Deed without Premier's
permission or approval and in an effort to circumvent Premier's objection to the
attempted sale of the property to Holmes. In light of Premier's clearly adverse
position to Holmes' title, First American's efforts to ignore Premier's claims and
proceed with the Special Warranty Deed invited litigation adverse to Holmes' title
and would have done so even if the Special Warranty Deed was accurate.
Unfortunately, the Special Warranty Deed contained a clear error thus
compounding the problem and further clouding Holmes' title. (R. at 13, ^f 73-78;
T. at 27-29.)

16

These arguments create genuine issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment. The trial court therefore erred when it resolved the question
of fact of whether or not First American took appropriate action in favor of First
American and ruled that First American honored its title insurance obligations and
is not liable.
The trial court further erred in rejecting Holmes5 arguments that First
American assumed and breached additional contractual obligations beyond those
associated with the Policy. (R. at 88-92; T. at 27-29.) Specifically, First
American closed the transaction between Holmes and Cook and prepared and
recorded the Warranty Deed that could not and did not convey to Holmes title to
the 323 acre parcel. First American charged Holmes and Cook for these services
and Holmes relied on those services in purchasing the property from Cook. First
American assumed the contractual obligation to prepare and record an effective
Warranty Deed and its failure to competently perform that duty is a breach of its
contractual obligations.
When First American prepared the Warranty Deed it also acted as an
abstractor of title and implicitly represented that the deed it prepared would
transfer title to Holmes. Obviously, the Warranty Deed did not transfer title in the
323 acre parcel and First American's errors in that context subject it to liability
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separate and apart from any obligations connected with title insurance policy.
First American's breach of these additional contractual duties is not subject to the
economic loss rule and the trial court erred in dismissing Holmes' claims through
summary judgment.
Cook also may not hide behind the Policy and First American's successful
defense of Holmes' title because Cook breached the warranties established by the
Warranty Deed to Holmes and the subsequent Special Warranty Deed Cook
signed in an effort to cure the ineffective transfer via the earlier Warranty Deed.
(R. at 234-36.) As a matter of law, warranty deeds establish affirmative covenants
on behalf of the grantee that the grantor is lawfully seized of the premises, that the
seller has good right to convey the property, that the seller guarantees that the
premises are free from encumbrances, that the grantor is in quiet possession of the
property and that the grantor forever warrants to defend title in the grantee against
any and all lawful adverse claims. Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1394 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). (R. at 235-36; T. at 31-32.)
Each of these duties are independent, contractual and clear. Just because
Cook participated in the successful defense of Holmes' title and purchased the
Policy to cover their promise and warranty to defend title does not mean that they
are absolved from their breach of the other warranties conveyed in the Warranty
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Deed. The duty to defend title is but one of the many duties Cook assumed by
signing the Warranty Deed. The trial court therefore erred when it ignored these
warranties and allowed Cook to avoid the ramifications of their breach of the
warranties established by the Warranty and Special Warranty Deeds. (R. at 235242.)
Cook is also liable to Holmes pursuant to the language of an Indemnity
Agreement wherein Cook agrees to indemnify and hold Holmes harmlessfroma
broad array of damages and losses that may arise from Cook's breach of any
warranty, covenant or agreement with Holmes. (R. at 180-81.) These contractual
promises, along with the warranties established in the Warranty and Special
Warranty deeds, are separate and apart from any duties associated with or covered
by the Policy. The trial court therefore erred in disregarding the clear and
unambiguous language of the Indemnity Agreement and in dismissing Holmes'
claims against Cook through summary judgment. (R. at 280.)
Finally, the trial court erred when it denied Holmes' motion to amend its
Complaint in response to the motions to dismiss filed by defendants. Rule 15 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that leave to amend is to be freely given
when requested. Defendants cannot point to any prejudicial delay or any other
reason why leave to amend should not have been granted. (R. at 92, 245.)
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VI. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF FIRST AMERICAN

1.

The Question of Whether or Not First American Took
Appropriate Action to Defend Holmes' Title Is a Question of Fact
Disputed by Holmes. The Trial Court Therefore Erred When it
Resolved That Question of Fact in Favor of First American.

The law is clear that summary judgment is precluded where there is a
genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hodges v. Howell. 2000 UT App 171, ^[6,
4 P.3d 803, 804. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to
have all the facts presented and the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered
in a light most favorable to it. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah
1991). Here, the trial court clearly ignored this long standing and well reasoned
principle of law when it granted First American's alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Holmes argued in its opposing papers that First American breached its
contractual obligation to defend Holmes' title when, in an attempt to vest title to
the 323 acre parcel in Holmes and correct its earlier mistakes, First American
negligently prepared a Special Warranty Deed in a direct effort to cure a serious
and potentially fatal defect in Holmes' title that was actually created by First
American less than one year earlier. (R. at 85-87.) Holmes established a genuine
20

issue of material fact when it argued before the trial court that First American did
not take "appropriate action" to defend Holmes' title and, in fact, took action that
actually gave rise to the litigation and fueled the adverse claim to title brought by
Keystone. (R. at 85-87.)
The Policy lists several options available to First American when a defect in
title arises or title is challenged by a third party. These options consist of settling
with the adverse party, paying Holmes' damages up to the limit of the title
insurance policy, defending title through litigation or taking any other action
"which in its [First American's] opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish
the title to the estate or interest." See paragraph 4(b) the Policy, (R. at 50.) The
Policy also requires First American to "take any appropriate action" and to do so
"diligently." (R. at 50) (emphasis added).
In its Motion, First American argued, and the trial court agreed, that it fully
complied with the terms of the Policy because it successfully defended Holmes'
title. While it is true that First American's defense of the Keystone litigation was
ultimately successful, the litigation was only one component of First American's
efforts to cure its own mistakes and defend Holmes' title; mistakes that created the
defects in Holmes' title in the first place. Furthermore, the litigation was, in part,
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the result of First American's feeble efforts to correct its own numerous and
repeated errors.
Specifically, prior to any litigation or adverse claim to title, First American
attempted to cure the defect in the faulty Quit Claim Deed, and remedy the
completely ineffective Warranty Deed from Cook to Holmes, by contacting
Premier and asking it to execute a new deed that correctly identified Lake Creek
Farms, LC as the grantor of the 323 acre parcel. Premier refused to cooperate in
this effort. (R. at 9.) Premier's refusal to cooperate raised a clear red flag that it
was adverse to Holmes' title. In spite of Premier's clear and hostile position to
Holmes' claim to the 323 acre parcel, First American thereafter prepared a Special
Warranty Deed for Cook Development's signature. However, the Special
Warranty Deed contained a critical error in how the signature block identified Paul
Cook and in what capacity Paul Cook signed the special Warranty Deed. (R. at
123.)
The efficacy of the Special Warranty Deed and First American's decision to
ignore Premier's apparent adverse position to Holmes' title are questionable at
best. What did First American do to insure that a special warranty deed signed by
one member of a limited liability company would effectively pass title to Holmes
when the other member of that limited liability company was clearly opposed to
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such actions? It goes without saying that litigation and a dispute as to Holmes'
title was imminent and likely, particularly when First American ignored Premier's
position however reasonable or unreasonable Premier's position may have been
and encouraged Cook as Premier's partner to transfer a $4 million asset to Holmes
over Premier's objections. These decisions, when coupled with a faulty special
warranty deed, are hardly "appropriate action." At the very least it is a question of
fact for the jury, not the trial court.
The Special Warranty Deed invited litigation, a lis pendens and an adverse
claim to Holmes' title. It did not clear Holmes' title or secure Holmes' position.
(R. at 84-85.) Only after 8 months of litigation and a court ruling did Holmes
have marketable and clear title to the property even though it bargained and paid
for such at the outset. At the very least, First American's efforts to execute the
Special Warranty Deed in an environment hostile to Holmes' title raise an issue of
fact as to whether or not First American took "appropriate action" to defend
Holmes title. Add to that the fact that First American botched the Special
Warranty Deed and recorded the same with a clear error that went to the heart of
Keystone's position in its litigation adverse to Holmes' title compounds the
factual nature of the inquiry and demonstrates why the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on behalf of First American.
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Keystone's Complaint relied heavily on the error in the Special Warranty
Deed. (R. at 11,fflf62-64; 83,114; 84,ffl[18-20; 86-87.) In fact, it was the very
foundation of Keystone's Complaint.9 Without the errors in the Special Warranty
Deed, Keystone's claims would have either been non-existent or totally frivolous
and easily defeated. As it was, defense counsel for Holmes and First American
had to reform the Special Warranty Deed by filing and recording an affidavit from
Paul Cook. (R. at 130-138.) Defense counsel then sought a judicial ruling
through summary judgment that the Special Warranty Deed was valid and
conveyed title in the land to Holmes. (R. at 63-77.)
Additionally, in attempting to correct the defects in Holmes' title, First
American assumed the role of an abstractor of title in several contexts. As will be
argued below, First American assumed abstractor liability and additional
contractual obligations not contemplated or included with the issuance of a title
insurance commitment report when it prepared the Warranty Deed for Cook's
signature. Cook make specific warranties in that document and did so with the
assistance of First American. Holmes relied on the warranties associated with the

9

The faulty Special Warranty Deed was specifically identified in Keystone's first
cause of action to quiet title. It further was the sole document and basis for Keystone's
second cause of action for slander of title and its fourth cause of action for fraud and
conspiracy to commit fraud.
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Warranty Deed and also relied on First American to prepare an accurate and
appropriate deed which it did not do.
Later, First American compounded its own mistakes and misrepresentations
when it represented to Holmes that the faulty Special Warranty Deed cured the
defects in Holmes' title and granted to Holmes clear title to the property in
question. (R. at 10-11, 83.) There can be no question or dispute that the
preparation of a Special Warranty Deed signed by someone in their individual
capacity without authority to sign the deed is not "appropriate action."
The fact that the faulty special warranty deed was not "appropriate action"
is further evidenced by the actions of defense counsel in the Keystone litigation
wherein an affidavit signed by Paul Cook was recorded with the Special Warranty
Deed attached in an effort to correct First American's errors in the Special
Warranty Deed. At the very least, a question of fact exists as to whether or not
First American acted as an abstractor in preparing and recording the Warranty and
Special Warranty Deeds and whether it breached the contractual obligations that
flow from its role as an abstractor. Also, Utah law specifically preserves causes of
action for negligent misrepresentation where a title insurer acts as an abstractor
and negligently performs those duties or misrepresents to its insured the status of
title. Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall 795 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah
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1990) ("Genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether Lawyer's
Title know that Tower would rely upon the commitment in making the loan.")
The trial court therefore erred when it granted summary judgment and
ignored the clear questions of fact presented by Holmes regarding First
American's efforts in defending title.
2.

First American Assumed and Breached Contractual Duties
Separate and Apart from Those Established by the Title Policy
When it Prepared Deeds Designed to Convey Title to Holmes
That Were Ineffective.

In its arguments before the trial court, First American relied on the
argument and presumption that the only contractual obligations it owes to Holmes
arise out of the Policy .10 (R. at 88-92.) However, as demonstrated in the
statement of facts above and the record before the trial court, First American
clearly assumed additional contractual duties when it agreed to prepare and record
deeds and act as the escrow agent for the parties in connection with Holmes'
purchase from Cook and performed these services for a fee. (R. at 119-21.) Put in
other terms, when First American agreed to prepare the Warranty Deed whereby
,0

On page 9 of First American's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of its Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for partial Summary Judgment (R.
at 35), First American states that "[o]ther than this policy [the title insurance policy],
Holmes and First American have no contractual or other relationship between them."
Such self serving statements clearly ignore the additional services First American
performed in conducting the closing and recording the Warranty Deed from Cook to
Holmes.
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Cook would transfer title to Holmes and further agreed to record such, it took on
additional obligations and duties to see that the Warranty Deed was accurately
prepared and effectively conveyed title to the land in question. See Culp 795 P.2d
at 655.
The Settlement Statement prepared by First American, (R. at 119-121),
shows that Holmes shared in the costs associated with closing the transaction with
Cook. Obviously, First American agreed to conduct the closing and prepare all of
the necessary documents needed to complete the transaction. In preparing the
Warranty Deed, First American had to obtain a legal description of the property to
be conveyed. It further had to identify and accurately describe the grantor in order
for the Warranty Deed to effectively transfer title. How First American obtained
the information needed to prepare the Warranty Deed and what efforts it employed
see that the Warranty Deed was accurate and sufficient to accomplish its stated
purpose is a factual question that warrants discovery and investigation by Holmes.
It cannot be resolved through summary judgment nor can First American hide
behind the title Policy and its successful defense of Holmes when it assumed
additional contractual obligations that it failed to properly perform.
First American also cannot argue that it acted as a mere scribe in preparing
the Warranty Deed. In Utah, the preparation of documents that fix legal
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obligations and relationships between parties constitutes the practice of law. Utah
State Bar v. Summerhaves & Havden. Public Adjusters. 905 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah
1995) (citing Malia v. Giles. 114 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1941)); see also Perkins v.
CTX Mortg. Co.. 969 P.2d 93, 95 (Wash. 1999) (holding that the preparation of
promissory notes and deeds of trust is the practice of law).
Therefore, First American's efforts in preparing the Warranty Deed and the
Special Warranty Deed constitute the practice of law. Its errors in preparing these
deeds is held to a higher standard of care and the duties that attach to such were
assumed by way of contract. This leaves several questions unanswered. Did First
American utilize the services of an attorney in preparing the faulty deeds? If so,
what did that attorney do to research title and ascertain the necessary information
to prepare the faulty deeds? Holmes is entitled to discovery with respect to these
facts. First American has not, and cannot at this juncture, set forth facts that show
that the preparation of the Warranty and Special Warranty Deeds was done by
legal counsel, nor can it show what due diligence and research was performed in
conjunction with the preparation of the Warranty Deed.
Simply put, one cannot prepare a deed expressly designed to convey title
with warranties without taking on abstractor liability or, at the very least,
additional contractual obligations not associated with the Policy that subject the
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title insurance company to contractual liability, including claims for negligent
misrepresentation. See Culp, 795 P2d at 655; see also Seeley v. Seymour. 190
Cal. App. 3d 844, 237 Cal. Rptr. 282, 291-92 (1987) (title insurance company can
be held liable for negligently recording an invalid document).11
The importance of the role First American played in the preparation of the
Warranty and Special Warranty Deeds is obvious when one examines the position
of trust and reliance the parties placed in First American when they retained it to
prepare documents and conduct the closing of the transaction. Cook and Holmes
hired First American to do several things. Initially, they hired First American to
provide title insurance insuring title to the property in Holmes. In conjunction
with this obligation, First American issued a title insurance commitment report
which outlined the exceptions against which First American would not insure.
Behind this title insurance commitment report is First American's apparently selfserving efforts to examine the chain of title and identify existing or potential
defects in the chain of title.12

u

The Seeley court found that u[t]itle companies participate in the vast majority of
real estate transactions in this state. As institutions charged with the public trust, it is
important that they be held accountable when their negligent acts result in economic harm
to individual property interests." Seeley, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 291-92 (1987).
12

Although it may not form the basis of a cause of action, Utah Code Ann. § 31A20-110(a) (Supp. 1985) requires title insurers and their agents to conduct "a reasonable
search and examination of the title and has made a determination of insurability of title
29

The process of issuing a title insurance commitment report in and of itself
may not normally create any duties or liability on the part of the title insurer. Culp
Construction Company v. Buildmart Mali 795 P.2d 650 (Utah 1990). In Culp,
where the Utah Supreme Court held that, in general, a title company is not an
abstractor of title and is therefore not subject to tort liability when its title
insurance commitment report fails to discover or disclose a defect in title adverse
to the insured.
If First American's involvement with the transaction between Holmes and
Cook ended with the issuance of the title insurance policy then First American's
motion regarding Holmes' negligent breach of contract claims might have some
merit. However, First American prepared and recorded the Warranty Deed and
the Special Warranty Deed and acted as Holmes' escrow agent for post-closing
transactions. The Policy does not address these activities in any way. The very
fact that First American received compensation for these services, separate and
apart from the premium charged for the Policy, creates separate contractual
obligations apart from the Policy. Id at 655 (establishing that title insurers can
assume additional duties beyond those outlined in the insurance policy, including
under sound underwriting principles." Clearly, this statute demonstrates how shallow and
unsound First American's underwriting principles and title search and examination
techniques were when it failed to discover the defects in Holmes' title in two separate title
insurance commitment reports and closings.
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those imposed on abstractors of title); see also New West Federal Savings and
Loan Ass'n. v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 818 P.2d 585, 589-90 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (citing Anderson v. Title Ins. Co.. 655 P.2d 82, 84-85 (Idaho 1982) and
recognizing that title insurers can assume additional contractual duties and
obligations beyond those identified in the policy of title insurance).
Several questions and references are raised by First American's conduct.
Did First American rely on its own title insurance commitment report and its own
title research in its that effort to prepare the Warranty Deed and the Special
Warranty Deed and the legal description of the property therein? If so, First
American acted as an abstractor. Otherwise, First American would have had to
perform a separate search of the chain of title to the 323 acre parcel in order to
accurately and competently prepare the Warranty Deed. Either way, First
American, as a deed preparer, is wearing a different hat and assumed additional
liability independent of its role as a title insurer. See Culp, 795 P.2d at 654, 655.
In short, Cook and Holmes hired First American and paid it to prepare and
record the necessary documents to complete the transaction contemplated by Cook
and Holmes. Holmes (and Cook for that matter) relied on First American to
provide these services in a professional and accurate manner, which it failed to do.
Title insurance was but one of those obligations. It is certainly reasonable for
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Holmes to rely on First American to ensure that the transaction proceeded and
concluded as contemplated and contracted by and between the parties and that the
deeds First American prepared properly conveyed title to the land. First American
was in a superior position to ascertain the status of title and see that the Warranty
Deed eventually signed by Cook accomplished what it purported to accomplish.
Unfortunately, the Warranty Deed did not accomplish this goal in any way and
was a complete nullity.
Clearly, First American assumed additional duties beyond those in the
Policy and breached those duties when it prepared the faulty Warranty Deed. The
trial court's decision to ignore these contractual obligations and First American's
breach of the same should be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF COOK DEVELOPMENT AND
PAUL COOK.

1.

Paul Cook and Cook Development May Not Avoid the Liability
and Obligations They Assumed In The Indemnification
Agreement and Other Contractual Documents That Clearly
Impose Additional Duties upon Them Regardless of Whether or
not Title Insurance Exists or Title Is Successfully Defended.

When Cook Development signed the Warranty Deed, it made specific
warranties and promises to (Holmes). These warranties include "[1] that [Cook
Development] is lawfully seized of the premises; [2] that [Cook Development] has
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good right to convey the same; [3] that [Cook Development] guarantees the
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof; [4] that the premises
are free from all encumbrances; and [5] that the grantor [Cook Development], [its]
heirs and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof
in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever." Schafir
v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1394 (Utah App. 1994); see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-21 (1953).13 Paul Cook individually also made similar promises and
covenants in various documents he signed, including the Indemnity Agreement
and the Extension Agreement. (R. at 180-181; 192-195.)
Each of these covenants run with the property and can, on an individual
basis, vest in the grantee a cause of action for breach of warranty when a covenant
is broken. See Creason v. Peterson. 24 Utah 2d 305, 307, 470 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah
1970) ('The majority rule, with which we are in accord, is that there is a breach of
warranty when it is shown that the grantor did not own the land that he purported
to convey by the warranty deed description").
It is undisputed that Cook Development did not own the property it
purported to convey to Holmes on May 19, 1998, nor did Cook Development own
13

"A warranty deed is a contract between the grantor and the grantee" wherein the
grantor gives to the grantee the covenants or promises established by Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-12. See Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 233 (Utah 1995).
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the property at the time it signed an agreement to sell the property to Holmes.
Thus, the second and third warranties referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 and
included in the Warranty Deed were breached the minute Cook Development
signed the Warranty Deed.
Cook successfully argued at the trial court that the eventual successful
defense of Holmes' title nullifies the breaches of the covenants referenced above
and absolves Cook of any liability for said breaches. Such arguments are not
logical or meritorious. Cook clearly breached several of the covenants established
by the Warranty Deed and other written agreements. Cook Development signed a
contract to sell real estate it did not own and had no right to sell. It thereafter
signed the Warranty Deed and conveyed title to property it did not own.
According to Section 57-1-12, Cook Development was not "lawfully seised of the
premises" and Cook Development did not have "good right to convey the same."
Paul Cook individually stood behind these representations and backed them with
his personal guarantee.
Although Cook (through the purchase of the Policy) vicariously upheld its
covenant to defend Holmes' title, the successful defense of title occurred well after
the damage was done. Furthermore, the covenant to defend is but one of several
covenants established by the Warranty Deed. Nothing in Section 57-1-12, or case
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law interpreting the same, supports the proposition that no breach occurred simply
because Cook honored and kept one of the five covenants it made (the duty to
defend) when it executed the Warranty Deed. Each covenant is separate and
individually made, and the breach of any one of those covenants is actionable by
the grantee. Ultimately, it is telling that the title to the property Holmes now
enjoys was granted to Holmes not by Cook Development, but by Lake Creek
Farms, LC, an entity that was never a party to the transaction between Holmes and
Cook. At no time whatsoever- either at closing, at the time the Special Warranty
Deed was executed, or when the Fourth District Court quieted title in Holmes-did
Cook Development ever honor or keep all of the covenants it made when it
executed the Warranty Deed.
Cook's argument that the successful defense of Holmes' title and its
vicarious keeping of that particular covenant cures all other breaches would
eviscerate the importance and necessity (as required by statute) of the other
covenants found in the Warranty Deed. Holmes relied on those warranties. To
focus only on the covenant to defend title deprives Holmes of the confidence, at a
very basic level, that it is buying the property from one who has the right to sell it.
No individual or entity would knowingly purchase real property from someone
who did not own the property and based solely on the covenant that the grantor
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will defend the grantee's title. What good are the covenants of seisen and "good
right to convey" if a grantee cannot rely on those covenants between the time of
closing and the time the defect is discovered and then successfully defended?
Simply put, it is a fundamental assumption on the part of a grantee that the grantor
who coveys to the grantee by way of warranty deed actually owns the property
and can convey the same to the grantee.14
Cook Development's argument also assumes Holmes was not damaged by
Cook Development's breach of the covenants established by the Warranty Deed
simply because title was successfully defended. Such is not in comport with Utah
law, including the cases cited by Cook Development in its Motion to Dismiss. In
George A. Lowe Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co.. 117 P. 874 (Utah 1911), the
grantee purchased a parcel of land that had been carved out of a larger tract owned
by the grantor. Unbeknownst to the grantee, a tax lien for the whole parcel owned
by the grantor attached a pro-rata portion of the past-due taxes to the parcel
conveyed to the grantee. When the tax commission demanded payment from the
14

Cook Development's argument is tantamount to absolving a tortfeasor who
severs a limb from his or her victim simply because the tortfeasor thereafter hired and
paid for a surgeon who successfully re-attached that limb and the victim ultimately
achieved full and complete function of the re-attached limb. It ignores the interim pain
and damage that occurs even though eventually all was restored to the victim. Here,
Holmes now has free and clear title to the property because Cook Development paid for a
title insurance policy. However, this does not resolve the significant damage incurred by
Holmes in the interim.
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grantee, the grantee went to the grantor and demanded payment. When the grantor
refused to pay the taxes the grantee was left with two choices. He could allow the
property he purchased to be foreclosed and liquidated to satisfy the lien or he
could pay the taxes and sue the grantor for reimbursement. The grantee paid the
taxes, (id at 875), and then successfully sued the grantor for breach of the
covenant that the "premises arefreefromall encumbrances.55 No other warranties
or covenants were at issue or alleged to be breached, even though the grantor did
not defend title by paying the taxes and arguably breached that covenant as well,
leaving the grantee to defend title by paying the taxes.
Other Utah cases involve a breach of one but not all of the covenants made
in a warranty deed that conforms with Section 57-1-12. See Brewer v. Peatross.
595 P.2d 866 (Utah 1979)(breach of covenant against encumbrances); George v.
Robison, 63 P. 819 (Utah 1901)(breach of the covenant of quiet and peaceable
possession).
The trial court clearly erred when it ruled that First American's successful
defense of Holmes5 title cured Cook Development's breach of the warranties it
gave Holmes in the Warranty Deed and the Special Warranty Deed. The trial
court's decision should therefore be reversed.
2.

Paul Cook and Cook Development Also Breached the Warranties
and Representations They Made and Promised in Paragraph 1 of
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the Indemnity Agreement and Paragraph 3 of the Extension and
Modification Agreement.
Not only did Cook Development breach the covenants and warranties made
in its Warranty Deed, but Cook also breached the warranties and representations
made in the Indemnity and Modification Agreements they signed on the day of
closing, May 19, 1998. It is undisputed that Cook Development did not have title
to the property when it signed the Indemnity and Modification Agreements just as
it did not have title to the property when it executed the Warranty Deed that same
day. Had Holmes known that Cook Development did not and could not convey
title it certainly would not have purchased the property Cook Development was
attempting to sell. At the very least, the terms would tiave been vastly different.
The trial court therefore erred in ignoring these contractual duties and in
resolving the question of fact of whether or not Cook breached these duties in
Cook's favor.
3.

Damages for Breach of the Covenants in a Warranty Deed
Include Much More than the Expenses Incurred in Successfully
Defending Title And, Instead, Include Actual Damages.

Cook argued before the trial court that the only damages available in breach
of warranty or covenant cases are those incurred in "cleaning up the title." (R. at
173-74.) However, not only is this statement not accurate or consistent with Utah
law, it is also misplaced in light of the precedent established by the cases cited by
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Cook in their Motion to Dismiss and that were apparently accepted as dispositive
by the trial court.
Specifically, Cook relied on Creason v. Peterson. 470 P.2d 403 (Utah 1970)
in support of the statement that the only damages Holmes is entitled to are those it
incurred in "cleaning up title." (R. at 172.) However, the quote cited by Cook
when placed in context and quoted in full actually states that a grantee "is only
entitled to the damage he suffers as a result of the breach thereof, but this
includes taking such measures as are reasonable and necessary to clear up any
difficulty which would represent a substantial flaw in his title." IcL at 404
(emphasis added). Nothing in Creason limits the damages to costs incurred in
"cleaning up title." In fact, Creason stands for the proposition that damages
incurred due to the breach of covenant and the costs incurred in quieting and
defending title are both available to grantees where the grantor breaches one or
more of the warranties in a warranty deed. IcL
The same is true in the case of Van Cott v. Jacklin. 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924).
(R. at 172.) Pursuant to the holding in Van Cott. damages available to a grantee
due to a grantor's breach of the covenants in a conveyance are that party's
"damages including costs and attorneys fees incurred by plaintiff in attempting to
sustain the title to the real estate referred to." Id. at 460. In Van Cott. the grantee
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lost a portion of the property he purchased from the grantor to an individual who
had a superior right or titled interest in that portion. The Van Cott court
summarized its holding at the end of its written opinion with the following
language:
In view of the great weight of authority, Iherefore, we feel
constrained to hold that in addition to the damages which we have
discussed on the first proposition the plaintiff is also entitled to
recover such reasonable sum as attorney fees as he may have paid or
has become legally obligated to pay together with the costs before
referred to.
Id. at 462-63. In reaching this holding, the Van Cott court quoted from 11 CYC
1172 that establishes the general principle that the grantee who loses a part of the
land conveyed may sue for breach of the covenants established by the deed of
conveyance and recover "the actual damage resulting from the eviction - not
exceeding the consideration paid - interest, and expenses of suit." Id at 461-62.
Simply put, Cook and the trial court misconstrued the holding in Van Cott
by arguing that Cook is liable to Holmes only for damages in an "amount that is
fairly and necessarily paid to extinguish the encumbrance plus attorney fees
reasonably incurred in contesting the encumbrance"). (R. at 172.) The trial court
therefore erred when it held that Cook vicariously satisfied its obligations through
First American's successful defense of Holmes' title and through its purchase of
Policy that paid all legal fees and costs associated with clearing Holmes' title.
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4.

The Indemnity Agreement Cook Signed by Paul Cook and Cook
Development Holds Them Responsible For Damages Resulting
from Misrepresentation, Breach of Warranty and Any Claims
Not Covered by the Title Insurance Policy.

Cook's arguments that the Indemnity Agreement they signed along with
Holmes does not apply in this instance leaves one wondering just what Cook
agreed to do and what obligations they took upon themselves in signing the
Agreement. The Indemnity Agreement requires Cook to indemnify Holmes and
hold Holmes harmless from:
(a) Any and all claims that arisefrom,or are in any way
related to, Seller's acquisition, ownership or development of the
Covered Property prior to the date of this Agreement, except for those
claims covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant
to the Purchase Agreement;
(b) Any damage, loss or deficiency resulting from any
misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any
covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any
agreement or any other document executed in connection with
Holmes purchase of the Covered Property; and
(c) All actions, suits, proceedings, demands, settlements,
assessments, judgments, costs, investigation expenses, interest,
penalties, legal fees and expenses incident to the transactions between
Cook Development and Holmes or involving or in connection with
the Covered Property.
(R. at 180, 234,)
Paragraph (a) of the Agreement limits Cook's obligation to indemnify
Holmes regarding "claims" not covered by the title insurance policy that arise out
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of Cook's "acquisition, ownership or development of the Covered Property prior
to the date of this Agreement." (R. at 180.) Paragraph (a) says nothing about
damages incurred by Holmes as a result of the activities of Cook prior to Holmes'
acquisition or damages that result from Cook's breach of any warranty, covenant
or promise to Holmes. Paragraph (a) is simply a recitation that applies to claims
adverse to Holmes' title that are not covered by title insurance. Obviously, Cook
cannot hide behind this paragraph so long as First American succeeds in arguing
that the title insurance policy does not cover Holmes damages. Paragraph (a) also
says nothing of damages, expenses, costs or attorney fees incurred by Holmes in a
claim adverse to its title. (R. at 180.)
Additionally, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Indemnity Agreement clearly
require Cook to indemnify Holmes regardless of what is covered by the Policy.
Paragraph (b) requires Cook to indemnify Holmes from "[a]ny damage, loss or
deficiency resulting from any misrepresentation, breach of warranty or
nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development
under any agreement or any other document executed in connection with Holmes
purchase of the Covered Property." (R. at 180.) Paragraph (b) does not offer any
grace or out for Cook and is not contingent on what title insurance pays for or
accomplishes by the defense of Holmes' title. It is also worth noting that
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paragraph (b) refers to "damage, loss or deficiency" as opposed to the "any and all
claims" language of paragraph (a). (R. at 180.)
Paragraph (c) obligates Cook to reimburse Holmes for its "costs,
investigation expenses, interest, penalties, legal fees and expenses incident to the
transactions between Cook Development and Holmes or involving or in
connection with the Covered Property." (R. at 180.) One of the elements of
Holmes' damages in this action is the interest payments it was forced to make on
the property without being able to sell lots or generate cash flow while the lis
pendens was in place. This paragraph also entitles Holmes to be reimbursed for
the attorneys fees it incurred in the quiet title action as well as in prosecuting this
action.
The trial court erred in ignoring the plain language of the Indemnity
Agreement and by ruling that Cook was entitled to Summary Judgment.
C.

LEAVE TO AMEND A COMPLAINT SHOULD BE FREELY
GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A MOTION TO DISMISS AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT
HOLMES MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear. "[A] party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Here, the trial
court denied Holmes' request to amend its Complaint in response to the motions
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filed by Cook and First American. Holmes requested leave of court and moved
for the opportunity to amend in the papers it filed in opposition to the motions to
dismiss. (R. at 92-93, 245; T. at 27.) However, the trial court's ruling and orders
are void of any explanation regarding Holmes' motions to amend. They were
simply denied without explanation. (R. at 255-56).
Cases where Utah appellate courts have found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in denying a motion to amend virtually all deal with situations where
previous amendment had already been allowed, where the case had been pending
for years before the motion to amend was filed, where the motion was brought on
the eve of trial, or where significant delay would occur or discoveiy deadlines had
passed. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah
1997) (motion to amend brought 4 years into the litigation and after trial of the
fundamental issue in case); Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch.. 663 P.2d 93 (Utah
1983) (amendment would delay trial and the substance of the new allegation was
known by the moving party one year earlier); Atcitty ex rel. Atcitty v. Board of
Education. 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (motion filed over two months
after discovery deadline and where moving party had long been aware of new
issues); Harper v. Summit County. 963 P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (motion
brought after summary judgment was entered and discovery complete); Kleinert
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v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (party had already
been allowed to amend once before in a three year old case involving an eight year
old injury); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light. 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(amendment would add two new defendants and motion was brought just before
trial).
Here, Holmes' motions to amend were brought in response to the motions to
dismiss filed by First American and Cook in response to Holmes' Complaint. No
discovery had occurred. No trial date was set and First American and Cook could
not and did not demonstrate any prejudice that would result if Holmes' motions
for leave to amend were granted.
In short, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Holmes' motions to
amend. In the event Holmes' appeal is unsuccessful on its other issues for review,
this matter should nevertheless be remanded to allow Holmes the opportunity to
amend its Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Holmes respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court's decisions granting Cook Development, Paul Cook and
First American's Motions to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment
and remand the case to the trial court for a jury trial.
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Dated this IC day of January, 2001.

^fer-

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
Barry N. Johnson
Daniel L. Steele
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant Holmes
Development, LLC
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foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant on the following person at the following
address:
Alan L. Sullivan, Esq.
Robert W. Payne, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West So. Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee First American Title Insurance
Company
Gifford W. Price
Gregory N. Jones
Mackey Price & Williams
57 West 200 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Paul Cook and Cook Development, LC
by mailing by first class mail with sufficient postage two true and accurate copies
of the Reply Brief of Appellant. Said copies were placed in a sealed envelope
addressed to counsel for Defendant/Appellee at the address set forth above.

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE
Barry N. Johnson
Daniel L. Steele
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant Holmes Development, LLC
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111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004
Telephone: (801) 237-1900
Facsimile: (801)237-1950
Attorneys for Defendant First American Title
Insurance Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HOLMES DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
PAUL COOK, an individual, COOK
DEVELOPMENT, LC, a Utah limited
liability company, and FIRST AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California
corporation,

Case No. 990910568
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

On April 10,2000, defendant First American Title Insurance Company's Motion
to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment (November 29,1999) came for
hearing before the Court, with the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Court Judge,
presiding. Plaintiff Holmes Development, LLC (hereinafter "Holmes") was represented by
Barry N. Johnson. Defendant First American Title Insurance Company (hereinafter "First
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American") was represented by Alan L. Sullivan. Defendant Paul Cook and defendant Cook
Development LC (hereinafter "Cook Development") were represented by Gregory N. Jones. At
the close of the hearing, the Court took the motion under advisement. On April 11,2000, the
Court issued its minute entry indicating that the motion would be converted to a summary
judgment motion due to extraneous matters considered by the Court and that the motion would
be granted for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda and stated at oral argument.
Based upon the memoranda and affidavit submitted to the Court and the
arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Pursuant to the terms of Rules 12(b) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Court has considered matters outside the pleadings, as presented by the parties, and therefore has
treated First American's motion as one for summary judgment. The Court will dispose of the
motion as provided by Rule 56, all parties having been given a reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
2.

Based upon the undisputed facts presented, the Court hereby concludes as

follows:
(a)

As a matter of law, First American did not proximately cause Holmes's

alleged injury because First American cured the title problem created by the defective Quit
Claim Deed of March 13,1998 before Keystone Development Company filed its quiet title
action against Holmes. According to the judgment of the Fourth District Court in the Keystone
litigation, the subsequent Special Warranty DeedfromLost Creek Farms LC to Homes dated
SULLIVA\SLC\125201 1
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September 3, 2000, effectively conveyed title to the disputed acreage to Holmes. Accordingly,
all of Holmes's claims against First American are barred as a matter of law
(b)

Holmes's claims against First American are also barred as a matter of law

by section 9(b) of the First American Title Insurance Policy, on or about dated May 20, 1998,
which provided in pertinent part: "If the company establishes the title, or removes the alleged
defect, lien or encumbrance . . . in a reasonably diligent manner by any method, including
litigation and the completion of any appeals therefrom, it shall have fully performed its
obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused
thereby."
(c)

Holmes's First Cause of Action for negligence and Third Cause of Action

for negligent misrepresentation against First American are also barred, as a matter of law, by the
rule that one may not recover economic losses under a theory of non-intentional tort.
(d)

In addition, Holmes's Third Cause of Action for negligent

misrepresentation is barred because, as a matter of law, First American could not have
reasonably expected Holmes to rely upon its conduct in connection with the transaction between
Cook Development and Lake Creek Farms Associates, LC.
(e)

Holmes's Second Cause of Action against First American for third-party

beneficiary liability is also barred, as a matter of law, because of the established rule that for a
third party to have an enforceable right, the contracting parties must have clearly intended to
confer a separate and distinct benefit upon a third party, and that neither Holmes nor Cook
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Development intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon Holmes as of the time that
they entered into their agreements.
3.

Based upon the foregoing conclusions, First American is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law in its favor.
4.

The First, Second and Third Causes of Action of the Complaint against First

American are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
5.

To the extent that Holmes moved for leave to amend its complaint, its motion is

denied because Holmes failed to present facts that would be necessary to state a legally sufficient
claim.
6.

Defendant First American is hereby awarded its costs of court incurred herein.

BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE, LLC

Barry N. Johnson
Counsel for Plaintiff
SULLIVA\SLCM25201 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, on theTff^day of April, 2000:
Barry N. Johnson, Esq.
Daniel L. Steele, Esq.
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE, LLC
3865 South Wasatch Blvd., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorneys for Holmes Development, LLC
Gifford W. Price
Gregory N. Jones
170 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Paul Cook and Cook Development LC
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FIIEB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG - 2 2000
Gifford W. Price (Utah #2647)
Gregory N. Jones (Utah #5978)
MACKEY PRICE & WILLIAMS
170 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 575-5000
Attorneys for Defendants Paul Cook
and Cook Development, LC
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HOLMES DEVELOPMENT. LLC, a Utah
limited liability company

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 990910568
\FQ

Vo.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick
PAUL COOK, an individual, COOK
DEVELOPMENT, LC, a Utah limited liability
company, and FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California
corporation,
Defendants

On April 10,2000, defendants Paul Cook and Cook Development, LC (collectively,
"Cook") Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment (February 11,2000) came for hearing before the
Court, with the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff
Holmes Development, LLC (hereinafter "Holmes") was represented by Barry N. Johnson.

OOPRR

Defendants Cook were represented by Gregory N. Jones. Defendant First American Title
Insurance Company was represented by Alan L. Sullivan. At the hearing the Court also heard
argument relative to defendant First Amerian Title Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment (November 29, 1999). At the close of the hearing,
the Court took the motion under advisement. On April 11, 2000, the Court issued its minute
entry indicating that the motion would be converted to a summary judgment motion due to
extraneous matters considered by the Court and that the motion would be granted for the reasons
specified in the supporting memoranda and stated at oral argument.
Based upon the memoranda and affidavit submitted to the Court and the arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Pursuant to the terms of Rules 12(b) and 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the

Court has considered matters outside the pleadings, as presented by the parties, and therefore has
treated Cook's motion as one for summary judgment. The Court will dispose of the motion as
provided by Rule 56.
2.

Based upon the undisputed facts presented, the Court hereby concludes as

follows:
(a)

Holmes's First Cause of Action for negligence against Cook is barred, as a

matter of law, by the rule that one may not recover economic losses under a theory of nonintentional tort.
(b)

0RD-421J.C0D

Holmes's Second Cause of Action for Breach of Contract/Third Party
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Beneficiary and Third Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation are inapplicable to Cook.
(c)

Holmes's Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Warranty is barred, as a

matter of law, by the fact that any breach of warranty which may have existed by the Quit Claim
Deed of March 13, 1998, was cured before Keystone Development Company filed its quiet title
action against Holmes. According to the judgment of the Fourth District Court in the Keystone
litigation, the subsequent Special Warranty Deed from Lake Creek Farms LC to Holmes dated
September 3, 1999, effectively conveyed title to the disputed real property to Holmes. The
conveyance of good title and successful defense of such title by defendant First American Title
Insurance Company provided Holmes the only remedies available for breach of warranty and a
claim for damages as alleged by Holmes is not permitted, as a matter of law.
(d)

Holmes's Fifth Cause of Action based upon an Indemnity Agreement

between Cook and Holmes is also barred, as a matter of law, as the damages alleged by Holmes
are not within the scope of the Indemnity Agreement.
3.

Based upon the forgoing conclusions, Cook is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law in its favor.
4.

The First, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action of the Complaint against Cook are

hereby dismissed with prejudice.
5.

To the extent that Holmes moved for leave to amend its Complaint, its motion is

denied.
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DATED this JPday ofyMf, 2000

BY THE COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE, LLC
Barry N. Johnson
Daniel L. Steele

Counsel for Plaintiff
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INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
I K S INDEMNITY AGREEMENT (this "Agreemeuf >) effective as of May 19,1998, is between
COOK DEVELOPMENT, LC, a Utah limited liability company ("Cook Development''), PAUL COOK,
and HOLMES VENTURES, LQ a Utah limited liability company (Ttttaacs").
RECITALS
ACock: Development and Holmes entered into a certain Real Estate Purchase Contract and
Agramsai dated April 2,1998 (the "Purchase Agreement'X as modified by Pm certain Modification and
Extension Agrxxmcnt of even date herewith, in which Cook Development agreed to sell and Holmes agreed
ID purchase ccxtain real property (the "Property*) described in the Purchase Agreement, which is
incorporated herein by this reference.
B.
Seeded 5.2.3 of the Purchase Agreement requires that Cook Development and Paul Cook
provide Holmes with an indemnification related to claims arising from Cook Development's ownership of
all of the Property except for the 6 lots on which the parries dosed in the ^ ^ € 1 0 5 ^ ' a s defined in the
Purchase Agreement (referred to as the c<Covered Property") C
Cook Development and Holmes anticipate dosing die Purchase Agreement on May 19,
1998 and, as a part of that closing, desire to enter into this Agreement
AGREEMENT
In consideration of the ahove recitals and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which ate hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:
1.
Indemnification. Cook Development and Paul Cook shall indemnify, defend and hold
harmless Holmes, its successors and assignsfromand against
(a) Any and all claims that arisefrom,or are in any way related to, Seller's acquisition,
ownership or development of the Covered Property prior to the date of this Agreement, jgxggit for those
claims covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant to the Purchase Agreement;
(b)
Any damage, loss or deficiency resultingfromany misrepres^tation, breach of
warranty or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any
agreement or any other document executed in connection with Holmes* purchase of the Covered Property;
and
(c) All actions, suits, proceedings, demands, settlements, assessments, judgments, costs,
investigation expenses, interest, penalties, legalfeesand expenses incident to the transactions between Cook
Development and Holmes or involving or in connection with the Covered Property,
2.

Representations and Warranties of Cook Development and Paul Cook.

(a)
Cook Development's and Paul Cook's execution of this Agreement complies with
-elevant law, and will not violate, conflict with, or cause a breach of any agreement to which either Cook
Development or Paul Cook is a party; and
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(b)
No breach of contract, tort or other claim in any way related to the Covered
Property has been asserted by any creditor, claimant or other person against Cook Development or Paul
Cook, act, to the best of Cook Developments and Paul Cook's knowledge, has there been any occurrence
which could giveriseto such a claim, nor has any suit, action or proceeding been threatened or commenced
against Cook Development or Paul Cook involving such a claim.
3,

Miscellaneous.

(a) All notices, requests, demands and other cxanmunications hereunder shall be given as
required in the Purchase Agreement
(b)
Nofeihiieto exercise, delay in exercising or angle or partial exercise of any right,
power or remedy by any party hereto shall constitute a waiver thereof or shall preclude any other or further
exercise of the same or any crtherright,power or remedy.
(c)
This Agreement constitutes Che entire agreement of the parties with respect to the
subject matter hereof and shall not be amended or modified except by written document signed by t ^
to be eharged with such amendment or modification.
(d) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. In the event suit
or action is brought by any party under this Agreement to enforce any of its terms, iris agreed the
prevailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney fee to hefixedby the trial and appellate courts.
(e) This Agreement shall be binding on the parties and their respective heirs, successors
and assigns.
EXECUTED as of the date first written above
COOK
pBmOPMENT, LC
OKDETOLOPMEN^C

iturf rt^Jllwa^
PaulCoolcManagw'
Datc.M£vJ9, 199%. ^

PAUL COOK
Date: May 19,1993
HOLMES VENTURES, LC

Manager
Date; May 19,1998
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